Opportunities to engage high-priority targets in urban areas occur unexpectedly and last only minutes or seconds. The ability to process information rapidly as a target situation develops, make on-the-spot decisions and respond with split-second timing means the difference between success and failure in killing or capturing terrorists, destroying illicit arms and preventing deadly incursions.

“Sensor-to-shooter” is shorthand for the process by which targets are detected, identified and engaged in modern mobile warfare. The engagement process is a time-critical operation that relies on advanced technologies. Efforts to reduce the targeting cycle have been attempted, but with limited effect. Recent developments in sensors, data transmission and integrated digital technologies, however, are shortening the kill chain and putting shooters on targets faster and with greater effect.

Examples of shorter kill chains are evident in Israel’s ongoing battles with terrorists in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and with the U.S. military’s combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But militaries worldwide are adding or upgrading these capabilities for combat or surveillance and reconnaissance. The ability to watch troubled areas in real time and respond almost as quickly has become a key component of asymmetric warfare.

Implementing such capabilities requires an extensive network that integrates all types of manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations. These include diverse resources like persistent sensors, satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicles, mast-mounted and aerostat-tethered imagers, radar and, of course, dismounted soldiers.

Israeli air force UAV cruises over Gaza in search of targets. Credit: ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES

Snipers, linked wirelessly into the sensor network, close the loop on the kill chain. When a target appears and is verified by a command level intelligence team, the commander can order the sniper to take it out, closing the loop between sensor and shooter in minutes.

A major element in the sensor-to-shooter cycle is the armed UAV. The best example is arguably the General Atomics RQ-1 Predator. Designed for surveillance, the Predator was originally equipped with a laser designator to guide weapons from other aircraft. It eventually acquired its own weapons in the form of Lockheed Martin’s Hellfire missiles.

In 2006, Israel’s combined capabilities of information gathering, precision attack and shortening the sensor-to-shooter cycle at the battalion level were tested in a field exercise involving Rafael’s SkyLite B long-endurance mini-UAV, Spike-LR multipurpose missile and Tycoon TCS tactical C4ISR system.

SkyLite B, combat proven in the Second Lebanon War, is a man-portable UAV capable of long periods of stealthy reconnaissance, day or night, in winds of 30 kt. Spike-LR is electro-optically guided. Tycoon is an interactive, field-proven, easy-to-use tool that provides a common and simple language between different forces and helps close the sensor-to-shooter cycle between reconnaissance and assault forces, as well as increasing fire-management efficiency.

During the demonstration, Spike teams were spread around an area. The SkyLite B UAV acquired a target, extracted coordinates and transferred them to the Tycoon TCS, which transmitted them to the Spike command launch unit. The Spike operator locked on the target and simulated firing the missile.

AH-64 Apache gunship is a workhorse in Israel’s counter-insurgency operations. Credit: ISRAELI AIR FORCE

After firing, SkyLite B received target coordinates from the Spike operator via Tycoon and conducted battle-damage assessment after the target was destroyed.