Small satellites have been widely regarded as second-rate by Pentagon and intelligence community officials, who opt for massive, high-technology spacecraft lasting a decade or more in orbit. But the time may finally be at hand for skeptics to begin accepting smaller, simpler systems for some national security missions.

If so, the face of the U.S. satellite industry could change dramatically because smaller satellites are less complex to build. If the barriers to entry into this market are lowered, the standard cast of Pentagon contractors could be joined by smaller, and potentially leaner, upstarts.

Procurement officials at the Pentagon and in the intelligence community are expected to make a number of decisions over the next two years that will impact the shape and constitution of their future satellite fleets. These include choices about the next-generation satellite communications, missile warning and overhead imaging fleets. The traditional big three Pentagon satellite makers - Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman - are standing by with various partnerships and designs for these requirements.

A new variable for defense and intelligence officials is mounting pressure from the Obama administration and Congress to rein in cost. Satellite programs are notoriously among the worst offenders of Pentagon projects gone awry with technology shortfalls, funding overruns and launch delays. So, Pentagon and industry officials expect scrutiny on how they embark on future satellite programs.

One influential Pentagon official says he's not just looking to the big three contractors to trim around the margins to find savings. Instead, Josh Hartman, senior adviser to Pentagon acquisition czar John Young, is hoping to turn the entire business model for satellite manufacturing upside down. His goal is to reinvigorate an atrophied industry while delivering reliable systems to field commanders.

The entry of smaller, simpler satellites into Pentagon and intelligence architectures is a piece of the strategy. "We are facing institutions that want to buy big things and who are reticent to move away to what is seen as . . . a little more mundane or not as complex," Hartman says. Officials who generate requirements in the Pentagon "are still more sold on the level of technology than they are on the need for pragmatism in our approach."

He is facing an uphill battle, however. Industry and Pentagon culture has been fostered under a "bigger is better" philosophy that began with the space race of the 1950s, says Siegfried Janson, a senior scientist at The Aerospace Corp. This company provides much of the systems engineering expertise to the Pentagon and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in developing satellites. Getting humans into space was the focal point around which the national security apparatus and industry blossomed. Launch vehicles were sized for that mission, he says, allowing satellite makers the luxury of large spacecraft buses, power supplies and solar arrays. Cost was ancillary to national security.

"I think the biggest obstacle we have in really understanding how small satellites should play is a cultural one. It is, in part, the way our processes inside the building work," Hartman says. "Programs are sold on advocacy. And advocacy gets built by having as many people as you can satisfied by what you are offering. And in space, the way that you get people satisfied with what you are offering is to build as much functionality into it as you can." This inevitably leads program managers in the Pentagon to push for large satellites, often making promises based on immature technology. Long development cycles, requiring a decade or more, are also common; once a system reaches orbit, its technology is generally 10 years old, Hartman says.

An example is the $11-billion Space-Based Infrared System (Sbirs) early-missile-warning constellation, which was conceived in the late 1990s and has been restructured several times. The launch of the first geosynchronous satellite is slated for next year. "We did shoot for the stars, and it is going to cost us a whole lot more money than we ever thought it was going to cost," he says. "It is going to last on orbit for a long time because we probably overengineered the solution. In the end, we are going to end up with a constellation that is 25-year-old technology once it gets up."

The Pentagon leadership is examining options for a Sbirs follow-on system that includes smaller, less complex designs using advances in infrared focal-plane-array technology for missile detection.