The story of Robert Gates's impact in 2008 is incomplete without acknowledging that there are major issues he must still address.

These range from broad policy questions, such as crafting a cohesive policy toward Iran and deciding how to close the Guantanamo Bay terrorist detention center in Cuba, to refining procurement strategies that will shape the future force and dictate military spending for years to come.

His ability to tackle them is limited. Gates's success or failure in managing relationships with allied militaries, as well as interservice funding squabbles, depends largely on a yet-to-be-named politically appointed leadership team. Gates alone, even with backing from President-elect Barack Obama, cannot merely will these questions to closure.

"Is he up to - and will he be allowed to - deal with the post-Iraq transition?" one industry consultant asks. The political team will have to be educated in the parochial interests of the services but focused on Gates's goal of joint requirements and collaborative decision-making. What is needed soon to set the stage for Gates's term under Obama is a strategy to address Taliban gains in southern Afghanistan, terrorist interests in destabilizing a nuclear-armed Pakistan, nuclear weapons developments in Iran and how the Pentagon will proceed with budgeting decisions in the wake of the Iraq war, including the repair or replacement of war-worn equipment.

Obama and Gates will face a crisis in U.S. national security planning, programming and budgeting, say Anthony Cordesman and Hans Ulrich Kaeser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Washington analysts say this crisis has been growing in the last eight years, demanding a broad restructuring of the U.S. national security effort, defense spending, military manpower, procurement and readiness.

"With the deepening economic crisis, President Obama will face a continuing meltdown in the Pentagon," agrees Winslow Wheeler of the Center for Defense Information. "This deep-seated deterioration in America's defenses consists of shrinking, aging combat forces that are less ready to fight - all at sharply increased cost. The Clinton administration made all these forces worse in the 1990s only to be significantly outdone at worsening them by Donald Rumsfeld, and even Robert Gates."

Nevertheless, even stalwart critics like Wheeler do not assign too much blame to Gates. "In truth, these forces are decades old, and they have been exacerbated by both Republicans and Democrats in both the Pentagon and Congress for many years."

Gates and Obama must also craft a policy accord on two key matters about which they seemingly disagree: missile defense and U.S. nuclear posture. Gates favors establishing sites in Poland and the Czech Republic for U.S. missile defense interceptors and a radar by about 2012. Those would be designed to counter threats from Iran, which could be capable around 2015 of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Obama, however, has reservations about the plans and has argued against what he calls unproven missile defense efforts.

Military officials are already exploring alternatives to placing ground-based two-stage interceptors in Poland and a tracking radar in the Czech Republic, says Gen. Victor Renuart, Jr., head of U.S. Northern Command.

Likewise, Gates is forward-leaning on the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), a new nuclear warhead he says is needed to improve the safety of today's aging systems. But Obama is concerned it could mar arms control efforts. Without the RRW, Gates and Obama must draw up a U.S. position on testing of existing weapons. Some experts say testing is needed to maintain the stockpile as it ages, though that raises many of the same issues internationally as does developing a new system.