Despite a "stunningly incompetent defense" by the Iraqi military, there are important lessons to be drawn from the conflict, says the Pentagon's top force-transformation official.

"Clearly those Russian advisers that [worked for Saddam Hussein] thought he had the wherewithal to mount a robust defense," said Arthur K. Cebrowski, the Pentagon's director of the Office for Force Transformation. Instead, major fighting was over in less than a month. "We create the appearances of an incompetent defense by being good," he said. "It's like watching a well-rehearsed football or basketball team. They make it look easy. That's the phenomenon you want." The U.S. and British forces moved around a noncontiguous battlefield "very much faster than anyone expected."

"Lessons learned" documents have yet to be compiled, much less analyzed and publicly discussed; however, areas of interest are already emerging.

There also are at least three lessons in the context of grand strategy, Cebrowski said. Great power politics are anachronistic. Instead, the world is divided among those who want to join in globalization and those who remain disconnected. "Disconnectedness is emerging as one of the great signals of danger. The department is going to have to pay attention and posture forces near such areas."

The U.S. military will adopt a policy of continuous change and the broadening of capabilities and options. "Other people study us and they adapt," Cebrowski said. "The two Russian generals who apparently advised the Iraqis were posturing for something that would have looked like the first gulf war. That's exactly what we wanted them to do. I don't mind generals planning for the last war so long as they are all on the other side."