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Details Of The Coalition's Use Of Airpower in Iraq Are Revealed


Apr 21, 2003



 

Aerial deception and misdirection, network-centric warfare and advanced communications were combined to swiftly collapse Iraq's defenses.

One clue to clandestine U.S. activity came from television footage shot early in the conflict of Iraqi soldiers combing the banks of the Tigris River in Baghdad and shooting into stands of reeds. The hunt for downed coalition pilots was triggered by two over-age U.S. Air Force Predator UAVs that had been stripped of equipment and flown into the city's airspace to probe its air defenses. Intelligence officials also monitored Iraqi communications during the search to see what was left functioning of Iraq's military command and control system.

The unmanned aircraft were never shot down and finally ran out of fuel, which doubtlessly told analysts something about the state of Iraq preparations. Baghdad was the zone of the country's most concentrated air defenses. One Predator plunged into the Tigris and the second into a lake. The UAVs were referred to as "chum" because they served as bait for the anti-aircraft defenses.

The Navy had its own deception campaign for its first two nights of operations over Baghdad. A Navy-flown DC-130 (a C-130 modified to carry and launch drones) dropped three Firebee target drones borrowed from the Air Force. Two others were ground launched. The unmanned aircraft flew over Baghdad spooling out clouds of chaff until they too ran out of fuel and crashed. They led the flights of Tomahawk cruise missiles responsible for the "shock and awe" attacks into Baghdad.

The UAV missions gave comfort to the attack pilots, but F-16CJ crews, who specialize in killing anti-aircraft defenses, said the "Iraqi radar was a no-show." After nearly a month of coalition attacks prior to the ground war, Iraq's air defense radars stayed silent for the most part. The Air Force actually had air tasking orders (ATO) 1 through 22 that involved flying about 4,000 sorties dedicated to breaking up the air defenses, before ATO-Alpha which covered operations for the first official day of the air war.

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