ESCALATION CLAUSE

There are signs the F/A-22 Raptor program is running into the same lethal combination of financial pressures, uneven progress in development and intensified congressional scrutiny that led to the cancellation of the U.S. Army's RAH-66 Comanche.

In the stealth fighter's defense, advocates point to major differences between the two programs that were both started in the early 1980s. Army officials were apathetic, almost weary, of Comanche and for years had given higher priority to heavy armor and other non-aviation efforts. In contrast, the Air Force's senior leaders continue to press for the supersonic fighter, both within the Pentagon and in its dealings with Congress, and they have stripped other projects to keep F/A-22 alive.

However, with defense budget growth expected to peak in Fiscal 2005 (with a significant slide to quickly follow) and with newer, perhaps more transformational, programs being moved forward such as unmanned and long-range strike aircraft, the Air Force again will have to defend the F/A-22 program vigorously against the kind of criticism that killed Comanche.

Right now, the F/A-22 has a total program cost that could top $300 million per aircraft, but a $120-million flyaway cost for the next production lot, said Air Force Secretary James Roche. The price may drop further to $110 million, he said. A new General Accounting Office report contends that the Air Force says it can afford only 218 of the fighters. "It's a new number to me," Roche said in answer to a question about the report's accuracy. "In terms of production, we still, so far, see around 275-277." Congress has waived cost caps on the development, which is expected to be about $28.7 billion.

Two new cost issues have emerged. The first may involve confusion and some conflict of priorities between development of a ground-attack capability for the F/A-22 and research into a FB-22 bomber version of the low-observability design. The second is growing congressional concern about the cost of adding precision and standoff weaponry to the F/A-22 as well as a radar that may offer resolution of as little as 1 ft. Service officials worry that some lawmakers and their staffs are confusing the two issues. As a contributing factor, the GAO report contends that adding an air-to-ground attack capability to the F/A-22 will cost $11.7 billion. (The GAO serves as Congress' investigative arm.)

"I would like to know what they're adding to the account that suggests that [additional cost]," Roche said. "The biggest thing we are doing is changing the radar. In changing the radar, the price falls 40%. We have some technology we're trying to integrate for catching moving targets that we're pressing. That may require more computing power . . . at some point in the growth of the airplane. That's all within the budget."

The huge F/A-22 cost increase suggested by the GAO has many in the Pentagon searching for its origins.

"THE FB-22 [BOMBER] CONCEPT has taken off, but some people think it's an extension of the F/A-22 [program]," said a senior Air Force official. "The FB-22 is [one candidate for] an interim solution to the long-range strike requirement and not a strike version of the F/A-22. It's a new and different aircraft. But a lot of people in the Defense Dept. and Congress think we've got another $5-10-billion addition to the F/A-22 program. That's not the case. The F/A-22 is fully budgeted through development of a robust air-to-ground capability."

There also appears to be some tension within Lockheed Martin. The advanced development programs (Skunk Works) group is promoting FB-22 in an attempt to capture some of the $45 million that Congress has provided for future bomber efforts. But F/A-22 officials don't want anything to threaten their funding by creating confusion over the program.