Some Pentagon officials appear to be withholding from lawmakers studies or parts of studies that analyze demands for cargo aircraft and their rescue and special operations derivatives, apparently because platform recommendations do not meet certain desires.

Both critics and advocates of the delay say that the reports -- including a study by Rand Corp. and the separate Joint Intra-theater Airlift Fleet Analysis Mix -- are complete. But the delays, according to officials familiar with the issues, stem from the fact that all the reports contend that the U.S. Air Force should not acquire the two-engine Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) because of its marginal efficiency, high cost, added logistics and relatively short range, which could hinder deployment in the Pacific.

"We operated C-27s in Panama for years and the [benefit] doesn't justify the cost," says a long-time airlift commander and acquisition official. "And we know that the Rand report pooh-poohs JCA for the Air Force. The Army needs it, but the Air Force has no business with a two-engine aircraft. Its usefulness is only marginally different from the C-130, yet the Air Force will have to add support, supply and training channels for the new aircraft."

By comparison, the Army vice chief of staff, Gen. Richard Cody, told JCA briefers that he cared far less about efficient airlift, according to a participant in the discussion. "Instead, he wanted effective airlift that is available when he needs it even if it's only to carry a small, but critical item. On the other hand, the Air Force won't take JCA out and fly it like a helicopter."

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley supposedly is supported by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), which wants to put a gun on the transport so that it also can act as a light gunship that can get in and out of small landing strips.

Special operators also are behind what has driven the Air Force to call for two additional C-27Bs in its unfunded requirements list. With a $74.8 million price tag, the funding would deliver to AFSOC the tactical airlifter two years ahead of the currently budgeted schedule.

JCA contract

A team made up of L-3 Communications, Alenia North America and Boeing won the JCA contract with the C-27J in June 2007. Contractors received an order for two aircraft in 2007 from the Army, while Congress has appropriated money for four more in 2008. The Pentagon has approved an initial $2.04 billion buy for 78 C-27Js, with 54 going to the Army and 24 to the Air Force.

Still, the U.S. Air Force is frustrated because it's running short of all its airlifters. The Army is unhappy because it wants airlift on demand. Meanwhile, major acquisition decisions remain stalled awaiting the transfer of the studies from the Pentagon to Congress that involve Boeing's C-17 and Lockheed Martin's veteran C-5 and advanced C-130J, as well as the new twin-engine C-27J.

But JCA is not the only battle ahead, as the Air Force has inserted several airlift projects in its unfunded requirements list that was submitted to Congress as part of the fiscal 2009 budget deliberations (DAILY, Feb. 13).

And there are political aspects to how the interservice debate plays out. The head of the Army National Guard has promised C-27s to Army National Guard units while the Air Force wants the JCAs to go to Air National Guard units to "maintain flags" that would otherwise disappear with the retirement of F-15 and F-16 units.

"As a result, parts of the studies have been classified and release of the reports held up," says an airlift commander.

Photo credit: C-27J Team