The report card is mixed regarding next-generation nonkinetic, or limited effects, weaponry ­developed by the U.S. and its allies.

Cyber-warfare turns on three critical aspects--attack, defense and assessment. Information-technology industry officials say attack capabilities are receiving attention and funding. Defenses against cyber-attack have begun attracting support because of persistent adversaries who flourish in the Wild West atmosphere of the Russian and Chinese cyber-worlds.

The big shortfall, they agree, is in battle damage assessment (BDA).

"I'm trying to render an enemy system nonfunctional with a nonkinetic attack," says John Osterholz, BAE Systems vice president for integrated cyber-warfare and cyber-security. "How do I know when I've succeeded? It still looks like it could kill me. So, the issue at the tactical level is BDA."

"The [weapons, sensor and communications] capabilities of every major nation-state have been digitized," he says. "[For countering that flexibility] the weapons of choice are viruses, worms and Trojans--weapons that work in the Internet protocol [IP] regime."

In the famous "Suter" series of electronic attack experiments at Nellis AFB, Nev., a data stream was fired into an integrated air defense network's antennas by an EC-130 Compass Call electronic attack aircraft. An RC-135W Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft monitored changes in the network's emissions. But that kind of insight is rare.

"We celebrate individual successes like Suter, but we really need to be focused on fuller integration into warfighting to the point that I have cyber-fires, just like I have kinetic fires," Osterholz says. "That is the real frontier that we have to address effectively."

The nonkinetic technologies that still require major investments "relate to how we couple intelligence analysis on a near, real-time or run-time basis in the battlespace," he says. "We're talking about very sophisticated [intelligence analysis] that provides support to the operators [in the time it takes to run data through a computer]. That's the operational art that needs to be written, generalized and normalized. There are technologies, training and doctrine associated with analysis of bomb damage assessment that need to see more emphasis."

However, the U.S. appears to have systemic problems with making operational or even understanding the impact of nonkinetic and digital attack, although technology offers successful weaponry.

The U.S. has had a vision for how to conduct irregular warfare for "an extremely long time," says Maj. Gen. David Scott, Air Force director of operational capability requirements and deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements. As a result, adversaries understand how the U.S. has applied it in the past and have devised tactics for evading allied efforts.