The first major military aircraft project of the Internet-era, the Joint Strike Fighter, faces a new opposition: a global, networked movement comprising independent and think-tank analysts, retired air force leaders and industry professionals and politicians concerned with the JSF’s financial and operational risks. All of them have immediate access to worldwide news, official reports and program briefings to an extent that was inconceivable when the F-22 was at the same stage of development a decade ago.

There are a few main themes that run through many JSF critiques—some of which are complicated by classified information—but the F-35 Joint Program Office and Lockheed Martin have responded to many of them.

•Risk: Critics assert that the JSF program represents a huge gamble. Alternative fighters—such as the F-22 and F/A-18—are due to go out of production soon. The JSF has yet to fly 100 sorties out of a 5,000-mission flight-test program. It is 30 months late, over budget and (depending on variant) 2,300-4,800 lb. above the empty weight goals set in 2002.

Response: JSF leaders say the problems are behind them and the program has stayed largely on track since the redesign of 2004-05. Modeling, simulation and ground tests reduce the uncertainties of flight-testing, and the flight-test program has the resources—including more than 30 dedicated aircraft—to complete the program by mid-2014.

•Cost: Independent analysts note that the real acquisition costs of JSF—a key factor in averting an F-22-like “death spiral” of declining numbers and increasing unit costs—are much higher than the less than $60 million quoted in many briefings (and by the Norwegian and Dutch governments). U.S. government numbers point to unit procurement costs in the $100-million range for the F-35A, in early years of high-rate production.

Response: Program officials say the cost will remain stable, relative to the figures reported to customers, as long as decision-makers continue to support the program as planned and do not cut back on production. What seem to be unrealistically low numbers are legitimate “flyaway” costs, rather than full acquisition costs, and most real increases over the original cost goals are the result of historic factors. There are ongoing efforts to put together a fixed-price, multiyear, multinational binding contract for non-U.S. customers.

•Capability: The “fifth-generation” tag applied to the JSF, critics and competitors assert, does not mean total superiority. The JSF cannot carry as many air-to-air missiles as a Eurofighter Typhoon or Sukhoi Su-35 and does not match their speed and agility. The weapons load is restricted in size and diversity unless the aircraft operates in non-stealth mode—in which case it lacks now-standard defenses, such as a towed decoy.

Response: The JSF will operate in “stealth mode” in high-risk situations, giving it an advantage in air combat. The JSF pilot, with unique situational awareness, will have the option of declining close-quarters maneuvering combat while tracking and engaging adversaries from any direction. In surface-attack missions, accurate and lethal weapons and the JSF’s all-weather precision targeting system mean that fewer large munitions are needed.

•Stealth: While the JSF’s radar cross-section characteristics are fixed by shape and construction, radar processing and networking are advancing according to Moore’s law, and new systems (like VHF radars) designed to detect stealth targets are under development. They may be even more effective against export-standard JSFs if those aircraft do not have the same stealth technology as U.S.-operated aircraft.

Response: The JSF program declines to confirm or deny the existence of an “export stealth” configuration. “Anti-stealth” radars are unproven beyond the laboratory and test stage, and program officials are confident the JSF’s stealth technology will be good enough to “break the kill chain”—that is, prevent the defenses from consistently detecting, tracking and engaging the aircraft—for the life of the system.