In the world of advanced weapons, the U.S. and its allies are pitted against loosely connected opponents, often stateless, who are unfettered by governments, laws or tradition. For now, the forces of chaos seem to be winning.

Optimists say the U.S. is making progress in developing next-generation weapons--the kind that involve electronic attack, network invasion, information operations and other nonkinetic weaponry. However, as with stealth a few decades ago, it is difficult to pinpoint the scope, direction and success of the research.

But skeptics counter that the U.S. is not establishing a lead in next-generation weapons that will keep it safe from attack by foreign versions of these same exotic devices. Cyber-weapon experts say the U.S. is already under such constant attack that the definition of "success" has shifted to containing intrusions instead of eliminating them.

Concerns already surround planning for the next phase of fighting in Afghanistan. Specialists and warfighters say that advanced nonkinetic technologies being injected into Afghanistan as part of the buildup will be hamstrung by technical inflexibility, an inability to transfer data, digital bottlenecks and a lack of information fusion.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is predicting a future that "will be more complex--where conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. We have to realize that the black-and-white distinction between conventional war and irregular war is an outdated model."

Moreover, there are unsettling predictions about U.S. combat in Southwest Asia. Veteran electronic- and cyber-operations specialists told the Assn. of Old Crows meeting in Washington last month that Afghanistan is fast turning into a poster child for the introduction of, and perhaps overreliance on, new concepts. Instead of profiting from experiences in Iraq, the U.S. may be re-creating the "electronic soup" that has plagued surveillance and UAV operations around Baghdad as well as efforts to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

"What have we learned in eight years of war?" asks Col. (ret.) Maxie McFarland, deputy chief of staff for intelligence at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. "We [started out] talking about knowledge-centric operations . . . and being able to act with precise force and accurate weapons within a framework that would allow us to know pretty much everything. What we've discovered . . . is that is just not so. That framework of knowledge and information doesn't exist. You [still] have to fight for information."

To further complicate irregular warfare, Afghanistan is being hit with a "bow wave" of technology involving advanced weapons, communications, cyber-operations, sensors, and both manned and unmanned intelligence-gathering aircraft that must be integrated, says Army Col. William Davis, deputy director for the Pentagon's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) task force. "It's all coming now as [those in Afghanistan] pivot from being have-nots to the big haves. Right now there are over 200 [coalition] systems at Bagram AB, Kandahar, and other places that don't talk to each other. That's not the basis for success." Yet "Area 82" (where ISR, signals intelligence and other classified efforts are isolated at Bagram) is growing at an exponential rate as assets are shifted there from the U.S. and Iraq.

The question then becomes whether the effort will collapse under the weight of systems that do not communicate. Added to this is the need to translate directives into 20 languages, the difficulty of sharing multilayered intelligence and a shortage of trained manpower. Will operational commanders be able to stay even notionally focused on finding an insurgent enemy, or will they be distracted by demands to make all the technology work together? Veteran electronic warfare specialists are already reporting that some warfighters are switching off technology because it is too complicated, distracting or interference-prone to be effective.

"The enemy today hides in [technological] complexity and exploits our seams," while a lack of thorough integration and flexibility in knowledge management "compounds the seams," says Army Lt. Gen. (ret.) Bob Wood. It will take flexible, multisensor systems capable of "reconfiguration on the fly" and "fusion of intelligence and information . . . to attack networks" in the effort to catch up with "an enemy that adapts faster than we do." He also points to an overreliance on technology and an under­investment in human resources for a "battlefield where human dynamics are important."