Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea

North Korea is talking war, but planning how to best avoid it while maintaining the maximum international turmoil. The rationale, believe U.S. analysts and military officials, is that constant provocation of the west is the only road to relevance.

The second underground nuclear explosion, a ballistic missile test and a series of tactical missile launches by North Korea are not signs of war, but rather assurance that there are more provocations – probably escalating in volume – on the way, say top U.S. military officials stationed in the Republic of Korea. But a major military event – either civil war in the north or a major strike against the south – is considered a remote possibility.

“Most probable [in a string of continuing provocations] are clashes in the western sea” where South Korean, North Korean and Chinese fishing interests conflict,” says Brig. Gen. Mike Keltz, vice commander of the 7th Air Force. Analysts point to the upcoming start of crabbing season as a possible flash point.

Other events could include additional tactical and ballistic missile firings, another nuclear test, restart of the nuclear program, a return to export of missiles and nuclear technology and cyber attacks that are undisguised as a demonstration of pride of authorship, Air Force analysts say.

However, North Korean blustering sounds like war. After the UN proposed a security resolution that would allow North Korean ships to be stopped and searched, South Korea said it would support a nuclear arms traffic proliferation security initiative. North Korea replied that it would consider South Korea’s support as declaration of war.

The international censure is sure to trigger more acting out on the world stage. The full impact of last week’s second underground nuclear explosion is still far from being completely analyzed. For the moment, the only real evidence are seismic readings of a 4.7 magnitude tremor from the same area in North Korea where an Oct. 2006 nuclear test produced a 4.1 reading.

Harder preliminary data was not expected for about four days after the test depending on how long it takes radioactive debris to escape the underground site and drift over the Sea of Japan where WC-135W Constant Phoenix aircraft, launched from Kadena AB, Okinawa, will be sampling the air. These specialized aircraft belong to the 45th Reconnaissance Squadron, 55th Wing stationed at Offutt AFB, Neb. Analysis of the 2006 explosion took nearly a month to complete.

The nuclear test produced “less than [a] 2 kiloton explosion,” says a Washington-based intelligence official. “It was bigger than last time, but somewhat less than predicted” – perhaps only 10 percent of expectation. But that is only a guess given that specifics will be known only when analysis of the test is complete, he says.

“It was [triggered] in the same underground complex as the 2006 test,” the U.S. official says. And, with an eye to the future, “There is enough plutonium for another test” within the next couple of years. However it has yet to be determined if this was a uranium or plutonium device, he says. As to additional ballistic missile tests, “there is some activity, but it’s hard to tell” if that means another launch is imminent, he says.

Gathering intelligence about North Korea is tough, say the experts. Human intelligence sources are non-existent while rugged terrain, underground facilities and lack of over flight all conspire against observation.

“There are many hardened, underground facilities because they are aware of our ISR capabilities,” say Col. Gordon Issler, 7th Air Force Chief of Intelligence. Complicating the analyses is the fact that “it has been many, many years since we’ve watched [the North Koreans] exercise or practice on any large scale,” Issler says. “So now it’s very hard to assess their logistics capability. What are their fuel reserves? A lot of it is underground. It’s hard to predict their consumption, how much fuel is stored and if is it still useable. But we do know that it is a country that suffers from a lack of resources.”

The highest tech and politically necessary part of a major battle would be the ROK and US air forces' effort to stop the artillery and missile bombardment of Seoul. While the artillery, up to 240mm, is a blunt force, the technological focus is on asymmetric capabilities (such as special operations forces), tactical missiles (including Scud variants) and weapons of mass destruction (such as chemical warheads).

“They are modernizing some of [those] capabilities,” says Col. Robert Nuovo, commander of the 7th AF’s ISR group and DGS-3. “The tracking and guidance of the Taepodong 2s is becoming much more accurate and range is increasing. Their ability to use computers for command and control is improving and they’re trying to network their air defenses. But because they are resource constrained and they lack combat experience, they need limited objectives. As a result, the ability to damage Seoul is a bargaining chip.”

Operators add details to the air defense scenario.

In the event of a large scale attack from the North, “the ROKAF and US would be flying upwards of 3,000 sorties per day against a very capable air defense,” Keltz says. That creates a lot of targets for North Korea’s weaponry. “Even though they have older weapons systems – SA-2s, SA-3s and [long-range] SA-5s – they’ve integrated them very well with computerized, fiber optic systems. They don’t radiate on predictable frequencies anymore.

“They’re improving their end-game targeting capability and decreasing the time that they have to radiate. They are exceptionally well trained, and that gives [allied] air crews less time to react.”

“With their advances in C4I -- linking EW directly to fire control systems – it decrease the time they need to use their target tracking radar thereby making an older missile more lethal,” Keltz says.

The need for such intense air attacks are as much a political requirement as a tactical and operational need.

“Conservative estimates are that the North Koreans could fire up to 250,000 rounds [of heavy artillery] for the first 24-48 hr. of the fight,” Keltz says.  “That makes it imperative to strike the long-range artillery tunnel system to decrease the volume of fire. An [associated requirement] is to systematically pinpoint those targets that we have to hit kinetically.

So why then is a major attack by North Korea considered unlikely? The answer is that they can’t afford to lose and they will lose a standup, conventional fight.

“They want to irritate us [with small clashes, weapons tests, and seemingly irrational rhetoric],” Issler says. “But they want to shut down any military adventure and start negotiations before it turns into a real war. They don’t want to use their military capabilities because they’ll lose it all. [It appears to be] a cycle of brinksmanship, but in fact we’re all outsiders and we’re all trying to figure out if the [North Korean] government is as impulsive as it seems or if there is a deeper game.”

Editor's Note: Issler's and DiNuovo's titles have been corrected.