Michael A Hough writes:

As the former Director/ Deputy Director of the Joint Strike Fighter Program (1997-2001) and Deputy Commandant of Aviation (2002-2006), I have watched with disappointment over the last few months as those advocates of sole-sourcing the F-35 with only the Pratt & Whitney engine have attempted to spin a tale of myth and innuendo to deliberately muddy the waters around the issue of the competition of the engine for the F-35. Let me set the record straight.

First, there was no JSF engine competition as part of the overall air frame competition. We didn’t compete the JSF engine ... it never happened! In 1995, the three primes in the competition selected the core of F-22 engine (119) to power the JSF demonstrators during the Program Definition & Risk Reduction Phase (1996-2001). This was done to leverage the maturity of the F-22’s 119 engine core to not only save money, but also to save time by reducing the cycle time of the phase to meet the milestones in the aggressive demonstration schedule.  Although it was simple as that, it was “not” a competition!

However, in December 1997, the Assistant Secretary Of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition directed the establishment of a Program Management Advisory Group (PMAG) to review technical and programmatic issues and determine cost and benefits of a second engine for the JSF program. Conclusions cited contractor responsiveness, industrial base, readiness, and international participation as benefits.

This study was followed by a second study by a PMAG conducted in 2002.  It revalidated the benefits of a second engine and acknowledged the “interchangeability” or “interoperability” of a second engine for all JSF variants that paved the way for the Joint Program Office to a plan that would compete the engines in the 2012-2013 timeframe. With both DoD and Congress’ support, the JSF engine competition became a reality and we saw immediate benefits in improvements in engine design, responsiveness of the contractors and reduction in costs.

We were thrilled as were all of our eight international partners who invested significant amounts of their national treasure into the F-35 program as well.   From the war fighter’s perspective, the second engine provided not only an interoperable alternative, but a “must have” insurance policy if either engine became grounded due to design, fatigue, or other reasons (commonly called ‘red stripe’).

Today, the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force employs a fleet of aging legacy tactical aircraft (F-18, AV-8, F-16, F-15) that can back each other up when the engine or fatigue grounds a type model series. After 2020 and on, all of these legacy aircraft will be in a “sunset retirement posture” with the JSF replacing all of the legacy aircraft in all services to include our closest allies in nine or more countries. It is vital that there is an “alternative” for the heart of the JSF, the engine, so as to not put our war fighters and our national/international security at risk due to short sightedness at this time with the decision to not fund the remaining 30% of the cost to develop of the second engine.

Don’t forget since 2006, Congress has provided the sole support of the program. DoD, due to short range money issues stopped supporting the program.  As I remember, it was all about immediate budget needs versus long term savings that competition delivers as well as improvements in combat readiness. I don’t remember being asked about the merits of having only one engine manufacturer for the program ... just that we had to balance that year’s budget.

Today the advocates of only one engine and no competition are doing through legislation what they had failed to do in past years and that is sad.  I have never been an advocate of a single engine solution for the JSF.  It simply is not good business and I believed it would fail to drive behavioral changes with the contractors and render potential decreased  “aircraft availability” down the road.  As we have seen during the last few years, the positive aspects of competition have improved engine reliability, cost, and maintainability and our entire JSF program is better for it.

Finally, the cost of competition in the near term is worth every penny. In today’s environment, it is surprising to me that DoD and the administration have turned their backs on the basic tenets of competing the engine makers against each other. No program within the government is a more positive example of the 2009 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act than this F-35 engine competition.

Hopefully this clears the air and stops the revisionists.  Competition is healthy for our nation as articulated by our President, our Congress, and DoD and for sure, our war fighters deserve competition and the benefits that it brings to the table.  I hope our Congress continues to support both engine manufacturers to build the most cost effective, powerful, and reliable engines to power America’s and our coalition partners’ F-35s to defend our national interests around the globe for years to come.

Michael A Hough

Lt. General, USMC (Retired)