The British penchant for inquiries continues with another raking over the coals concerning Iraq’s (WMD) capability – or rather as it turned out the lack thereof.

The issue is egregious in the UK since Saddam Hussein’s WMD capability provided either the fig leaf or the legitimacy - depending on your perspective - for the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s commitment to support the U.S.-led invasion.

Public hearings into UK involvement in the Iraqi war – and the lessons that can be learned - began November 24. The inquiry is not expected to report until after the general election, this has to be held no later than the beginning of June 2010. The government announced the inquiry in June, with work getting underway at the end of July.

While very early days in the public sessions, the evidence being heard makes apparent the contingent and contradictory nature of the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs, which chime oddly with the political claims at the time.

Irrespective of the political hand-bagging that may surround the inquiry, one issue that remains worthy of careful consideration is the relationship between the intelligence community, the civil service, and politicians.

By the time then Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered the – in retrospect – incorrect claims as to the Iraqi regime’s WMD capability – any sense of the intelligence community’s equivocation had been washed out.

Blair told the British Parliament in September 2002: “The intelligence picture that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes.”

Concerning the 45-mimute claim Tim Dowse, now the Director of Intelligence and National Security in the Foreign Office, and from 2001-03 the head of the Foreign Office’s Counter-Proliferation dept. told the inquiry: “As I say it subsequently took on a rather iconic status, but I don’t think those of us who saw the initial report really gave it – it didn’t seem – it wasn’t surprising.”

The 45-minute claim, however, proved to be a gift to the headline writers – particularly when the means and range of the delivery remain unstated.

Dowse says he assumed this referred to multi-barrel rocket launchers, but such granularity was lacking in the political statements at the time.

He added, “I don’t think we ever said it was for use on board a ballistic missile.…”

Defense academic Lawrence Freedman, one of the inquiry committee members, noted to Dowse “But you didn’t say it wasn’t”.

Dowse told the inquiry:  “We have to be prepared to ask difficult questions and challenge our own assumptions, and I think in respect of Iraq that broke down…it was a failure of the system.”

The why and where of the intel analysis – and the use thereof - remains of key importance, not least of all to avoid a repetition of a decision making process that led to the UK going to war at least partly on the basis of flawed intelligence.

Picture Credit FAS