The years-long mentoring program that paired American Embedded Training Teams (ETT) with Afghan National Army units came to an end last month with little fanfare, even though it marked a major change in the way the United States and its allies are trying to stand up the Afghan armed forces. For several years, the ETT mission paired small groups of a dozen or so American soldiers and Marines with larger Afghan units, mentoring them on everything from weapon discipline to mission planning and logistical tasks in the field. This has changed to what Major General Richard Formica, commanding general of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) calls the “two-brigade concept” that places more emphasis on partnering and less on mentoring, with the 48th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division focusing their efforts exclusively on the mission.
“There will be the expectation that the embedded partner will not only do the partner tasks, but they will also do the very specific mentor tasks that an ETT does,” Gen. Formica told ARES. But even this is slated to change. The CSTC, which until recently oversaw all of the training of the Afghan National Security Forces, has handed off the partnering and mentoring duties at the Corps level and below to the newly created ISAF Joint Command office, headed by Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, who has assumed control of day-to-day tactical operations in Afghanistan.
Under this new structure, for the first time regional commanders will assume responsibility for the partnership and training mission in their area of operation, Gen. Formica says. And “not only will they have the assets of these two brigades available to them, but the role of the brigades working for the regional commands are going to be expected to do embedded partnering” exclusively, leaving the commander’s other units free to wage the counterinsurgency fight.
But the CSTC isn’t going away. Instead of controlling the training and fielding of the Afghan armed forces, Formica says that the CSTC will now focus on “generating the force.” This includes working with the Afghan ministries of Defense and the Interior, as well as national-level logistics, Afghan Air Corps, and providing “institutional training” like basic training, officer and NCO development, police training, running the military academies, and working to generate new soldiers and new units. “This is a complex command,” Formica says, “we operate at the ministerial and institutional level all the way down to the Kandak level, and while this will still be a complex command, we’ll let the regional commanders train Corps level and below and I think that will make a better fit.”
What does this look like on the ground? Former ETT leader Sergeant First Class Tim Burd of the 48th Brigade of the Georgia National Guard emails to say that he’s happy that his unit will “become battlespace owners” while working with the ANA in their area. “The good side is that I will have my Platoon back working with me and not just the 14 [soldiers] on the ETT mission. The down side is we are moving to a new location,” away from the Afghan troops he and his men have lived with for months, to partner with a company-sized element of the Afghan army.
It’s a big change in the way ISAF is working to stand up the Afghan Armed Forces, and one that depends largely on the ability and the willingness of the regional commanders to resource and support the partnering mission with as much care as they give to the units already under their command.
We're still fighting this war with hands tied, flawed strategy and questionable goals.
Its beyond time to go. ELP calls it "useless dirt"...I won't go that far but this is a waste of resources and lives at this point.
But I believe we should stay, especially now, because conditions on the ground *are* changing for the best. Yes, I know, the UN is recalling its staff, and Taliban attacks are increasing, and the elections were a mess, and corruption will still be an issue.
But there IS progress in Afghanistan; central and southern Helmand are secured, our 'footprint' in both Uruzgan and Zabul expanded (the 'inkblotch'), Kandahar City is stabilized and there were honest-to-God elections. Messy ones, but elections nonetheless - a big deal in an originally non-democratic, tribal culture.
Re those ETTs, similar OMLTs from Australia and the Netherlands are confident in the Kandaks (ANA battalions) they are integrated with. Every month more and better trained ANA troops are replacing 'police auxiliaries' in the villages and outposts, improving security and local confidence.
It's going to be a long, uphill struggle, but we are going 'up'.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/316-west.pdf
The ANA I saw can fight just fine, and they're plenty brave, but as of right now they lack an expeditionary capacity. In other words, they can't feed, clothe or equip themselves without our help, so therefore they can't spend a lot of time in the field without ISAF troops right there alongside them. We're just not doing enough to train them -- two brigades of trainers simply isn't going to cut it. We need more trainers and partners, and the CSTC needs to take a much harder line with the Ministries they're mentoring. Break the teacups. This is a serious problem, and the corruption goes down to the Kandak and company level (though some company commanders sell their unit's fuel in order to buy food for their men when the logistics system breaks down, so not all theft is created equal in this complex and dysfunctional environment.) The amount of graft and kickbacks on the ground really can't be overstated -- it is pervasive and cancerous.
A few soldiers I spoke with who had done tours in Iraq told me that the Afghan soldiers actually operated on a higher level than the Iraqis -- the Afghans are harder workers, more willing to learn, friendlier, and more accepting of criticism. They are also much less burdened by sect than the Iraqis, and the Afghan people are as a rule more welcoming of the ANA than the Iraqis were of their own army. So there's hope there, if we can get the ANA up to a reasonable standard in a reasonable amount of time. Remember, we're building a military from scratch. Iraq, with it's massive pre-2003 military, had a military culture. Afghanistan has a culture of combat, but let's not confuse that with what we would consider a military culture.