Some interesting points emerge in Michael Bruno's report on new USAF chief Gen. Norton Schwartz's confirmation hearing.
Schwartz indicated that the USAF might be ready to relax its insistence on using rated pilots to fly UAVs. Today, Predators and Reapers are flown by fully rated pilots, but the rapid expansion of the force, and the fact that the aircraft can and do fly around the clock, has created a shortage of pilots. Expanding the training pipeline while supporting operations has proved difficult.
Using non-rated pilots does not necessarily mean using non-pilots. General Atomics-ASI, in its own test and checkout operations, uses civilian-trained pilots to fly the "front seat" of the UAV, with a technician operating the sensor. In the USAF, the sensor operator - who's responsible for tracking targets for the UAV's weapons - is a nonpilot. So the option for the USAF is to put a uniformed person with a civilian pilot's license in the front seat. Also, there's no reason why the UAV launch and recovery crews can't be civilian trained, or even a contractor.
This is not a problem that is going to go away, even if the tempo of combat operations slows down. Although UAVs don't have to fly for training purposes, the operator - whether the USAF or the Army - will need enough trained crews on hand to provide 24-hour orbits in a crisis.
The long-term solution is probably to make UAVs more autonomous. The medium-term solution is to improve the ground control stations, reducing training time. For now, though, the USAF operation is running to stay in place and has no time to adopt new technology.
Schwartz also referred to Wide Area Airborne Surveillance (WAAS). DTI reported on one development of this kind last year. WAAS is a new concept in airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In contrast to conventional UAV sensors, which provide full motion video (FMV) imagery of a very small patch on the ground, WAAS images a far greater area - multiple kilometers square - at a much lower refresh rate, one or two cycles per second. The technical enabler for WAAS is compact storage, which allows the operator to store, "rewind" and fast-forward and reverse the imagery to see patterns in movement.
Finally, Schwartz talked about "Liberty Ship" production of light manned ISR aircraft. I for one have not heard this phrase before, but my guess is that it involves attaching WAAS and other UAV-type sensors to an off-the-shelf platform like a Raytheon King Air, Pilatus PC-12 or Cessna Caravan - as has already been done for Iraqi forces.
Iraqi King Air with ventral sensor "canoe" and self-defense systems (USAF photo)
Why do this? Possibly to ease the strain on communications bandwidth, by putting the sensor operator on the aircraft and in line-of-sight to ISR users on the ground; possibly to avoid manned/unmanned deconfliction issues. But together with Schwartz's other comments, it reminds us that we are still in the early days of UAVs.
>bandwidth, by putting the sensor operator on the aircraft and in
>line-of-sight to ISR users on the ground; possibly to avoid
>manned/unmanned deconfliction issues.
Bill,
Didn't the USAF brass under the previous CoS claim that the USAF run Predator drone was superior to Army Sky Warriors because all its pilots were back in the USA communicating by satellite while the Army troops were in theater?
Anyone familiar with the military satellite bandwidth issues knew it was complete rot, but changing that line on a dime completely undercuts the USAF position on the Army fielding armed UAVs in Congress.
Also, the other services will see this as a "special pleading" for more USAF piloted aircraft instead of UAV's as another attempt by the USAF to retain budget control of the ISR resources needed by ground troops in the COIN environment.
The real reason the previous USAF CoS and Secretary were sacked was because the USAF was not seen as a team player during a shooting war.
This move by Schwartz utterly reinforces that perception in the other military services.
Obviously you hate the military! And freedom! The two things you hate are the military and freedom, and also soldiers! The three things you hate are the military and freedom and soldiers! And also pie! (oh, damn!)
1) You need to have a military pilot and sensor operator who is familiar with whatever type of combat the UAV is involved with
2)You may not need the military pilot during transit to and from the patrol or hot area.
3) The USAF is now putting Tanker pilots and fresh rookies through the training. Both take a much longer time to be capable of any combat.
Some ideas to explore
1) Vegas - the concept of one location for training and one location for operators is not a good idea. Especially the concept of one location for operators needs to be refined. Put the operations where the big fighter bases are. This would allow hands on real world proficiency training for fighter jocks. This would also greatly expand the number of pilots who can pull overnight UAV duty. If the squadron is at home then the squadrons flyboys can pull duty.
2) Consider hiring under G.S. pilots who have retired. This would be a great situation for Army and Marine rotor wing pilots who after 20 have no where to go. If I am on the ground I would greatly prefer a retired 20 year CWO4 putting a hellfire down near me vice a USAF trainee. Vegas is NOT going to cut it. Besides the congestion whose wife is going to want to move to Vegas? Think retirement places that are not expensive. Think Mark Clark, Virginia Beach, Beaufort SC, Florida, Gulf Coast Bases. Why not take the Marine out of the CH-46 on Friday and have him or her at the console pulling day duty the next Monday?
3. Sensor Operator - WHY IS IT NOT A COMBAT VET. You are telling me that with all the injured or those who have left the service that it is not a requirement to have a Soldier or Marine ground pounder doing this job? Lets rethink that position.
4. Future - The Navy and Marines need to look at this mess and learn from the USAF. Either consider the choices I posted above or think up some better ideas than the USAF.
Surface Navy - Good points, creative suggestions.
>issue - bandwidth is going to be a problem as soon as the UAV is
>over the horizon, and it makes no sense at all to tether a
>Predator to line-of-sight.
Bill,
Reachback to CONUS versus in-theater bandwidth is absolutely an issue. A cost issue.
Satellite bandwidth, even that provided by "smallsats" costs 10 times what in-theater, non-line-of-site, bandwidth costs.
That is why the US Army developed a weather balloon "Satellite transponder" as a satellite substitute. Even taking into account it costs $25,000 per balloon and the fact each ballon could be used 2-3 times, it was 1/10th the cost of leasing satellite transponder time for video or using new military comsats.
See below:
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htspace/articles/20070822.aspx
>The U.S. Department of Defense has known for several years that it
>cannot afford sufficient satellites to meet the growing demand for
>communications satellites. The commsats cost at least $250 million
>each, and even the much touted micro-sats still cost about ten
>percent of that. One of the more imaginative alternatives turned
>out to be things like weather balloons equipped with satellite
>commo gear. The high altitude "satellite replacement" balloons are
>based on existing weather balloon designs, but carrying
>communications gear instead of weather sensors. As long as you can
>pick up and broadcast the same kind of signals commsats handle,
>you can put the equipment in a high altitude (up to 100,000 feet)
>balloon, or even a bomber or tanker that spends hours circling the
>battlefield. Much of the satellite communications needed by combat
>troops is with other people in the same general area. So the
>commsat replacement (a balloon or B-52) can do the job, passing
>off the long distance stuff to the real commsat.
>
>A balloon can cover troops needs for about a thousand kilometers
>in all directions. A B-52 or KC-135 tanker can deal with a smaller
>area, but is even cheaper than $25,000 balloon, which is often
>only good for a few missions. Once launched, the balloon turns on
>its battery powered transponder when it has reached the proper
>altitude, maintaining its position like a hot air balloon, using
>computerized controls. It acts like a very low flying satellite
>until the battery runs out after 8-12 hours. Then the balloon
>deflates, a parachute brings it to earth in one piece, and a GPS
>beacon makes it possible for the equipment to be recovered for
>reuse.
>
>One of the more useful aspects of balloons is that they are easy
>to carry, and can be inflated and launched by a Special Forces
>team out in the middle of nowhere. Special Forces recon teams
>often want to send back live video of whoever they are keeping an
>eye on. These balloon sats make that easier, because they can also
>carry satellite grade sensors (various types of night and day
>cameras).
>
>The major cause of more commsat use is live video being generated
>by the increasing number of vidcams on the battlefield. These vids
>are being exchanged by the units cooperating in an operation.
>Since that's all local, a "satellite substitute" (a balloon, or
>aircraft carrying the comm. Gear) will work. To that end, there
>are even plans to put the comm gear in UAVs, including special
>UAVs that just fly circles high in the sky, acting as satellite
>substitutes. These substitutes cost less than ten percent, per
>hour in use, of what satellites cost.
>be organic to a division, despite having the range and mobility to
>be theater-wide. Inevitably this means that some areas would be
>oversupplied and others undersupplied.
Bill,
I see you are quoting Gen Deptula from that Financial Times article from last year.
I'll see you and raise you a quote from the same article:
>Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace expert at the Teal Group, says the
>debate poses a real dilemma.
>
> What the army suspects, rightly or wrongly, is thank you for
>filing your flight access request. We will get back to you within
>a 48-72 hour period and make certain that there are no air assets.
>Thank you and this is not a recording, says Mr Aboulafia.
That US Army fear is well grounded in recent reality.
During the 2003 drive on Baghdad, the USAF removed all Preditor and Global Hawk UAV video support for US Army ground forces advancing into Iraq to "Address Theater Level Needs."
A single Shadow UAV unit was all the Army had left in terms of UAV video support. It was not enough.
The US Army does not want to be in such a position ever again. By owning the Sky Warriors free, clear, and beyond USAF control, "Sub-optimal usage" by Army units can be guarenteed.
In the end, Bill, this is an issue of trust between the USAF and other services.
The following is an e-mail I received from a serving US Army Sgt. on the USAF in Iraq and how USAF institutional attitudes are towards the ground services have been expressed in terms of deeds.
>I lived it in Balad, where the USAF flat out told me the infantry
>and Army in general is there to support and protect the USAF so
>they can win the war. The reason the Coalition was not winning
>was because they were being held back. These are the same people
>who rarely, if ever, leave the FOB and meet Iraqis, let alone
>negotiate and interact. The comptroller in Tallil, whose stated
>mission was to work with the locals to pave MSR Tampa, pawned that
>off so fast it wasn't funny because "it's not my job to leave the
>wire."
>
>There have been requests for immediate medevac when all USA and
>USMC birds were busy....and the USAF refused. "Not my job". The
>ONLY way they could get USAF EOD team off the FOB to do an EOD
>mission was when the USAF dropped a bomb that didn't go boom.
>
>I know there are exceptions. I know its not all of the USAF. But
>I lived amongst them for a year, watching them come, watching them
>go as a resident of H6, the USAF compound within Anaconda (and it
>was fenced and passcoded to keep US Army out...but foruntately we
>have USA aviators there to dime out the code). I worked with
>them. There are a lot of great people. But you won't see their
>dozers out filling damaged roads. You won't even see them carry a
>weapon. "That's what we have the Army for."
Right now, by word and deed, the USAF is not trusted by Army troopers or Marines to be a team player.
As for this comment:
>The USAF also suggested that all the UAVs in theater which
>operated in the altitude bands routinely used by fixed wing assets
>in combat or transit should belong to the same force.
The US Army agrees and makes the following point:
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20070702.aspx
>You Can't Take The Sky From Me
>
>July 2, 2007: The battle, between the U.S. Army and Air Force,
>over who controls the air space over the battlefield, continues to
>heat up. What's happened, in effect, is that that, because of UAVs
>and smart bombs, most of the aircraft over the battlefield belong
>to the army. As a result, the army wants to have control over that
>air space, even though, traditionally, the air force has been in
>charge. The army is pushing the fact that most of the aerial
>vehicles (UAVs, helicopters, artillery shells, rockets) at low
>altitudes (under 20,000 feet) are army. For example, the army
>currently has over 1,300 UAVs in Iraq, over 200 helicopters, and
>dozens of rocket launchers and 155mm guns. In effect, over 95
>percent of the aircraft at low altitudes belong to the army. It
>makes no sense to have the air force calling the shots. To handle
>all this traffic, the army has developed an air traffic control
>system (TAIS, or Tactical Airspace Integration System) which uses
>a laptop screen to show all air traffic in a several hundred
>square kilometer area. TAIS systems cost about $3 million each,
>and draws data from many sources, to allow army commanders to have
>a 3-D view of what's up there. The army has TAIS link to air
>force ATC (air traffic control), but the air force attitude is
>that they have always called the shots over who does what up
>there, and that's the way it should stay.
I don't want this to develop into an Army-versus-USAF deal, because it really isn't. The 2003 shortfall was real - it was early in the game - and it was really the Army's job to provide UAVs to cover moving ground forces. That is absolutely not what a G-Hawk is for, and I suspect that the Predators were tasked elsewhere by authorities higher than the air component commander. So yes, the Army should have tactical UAVs for that job.
The basic idea is that aircraft in the same domain should be under common control. USAF or Army? I don't really care too much, but whoever takes it on must be responsible for all of it. So if the Army wants the airspace up to 20,000 feet, it's responsible for fighters, transiting/climbing/descending transports, helicopters, UAVs, allied aircraft, and needs to provide the trained people to do that.
But what we can't afford to do is duplicate capabilities because one service says that it doesn't trust the other one. That's the problem that needs to be fixed, not Band-Aided by giving the Army its own air force.
>one service says that it doesn't trust the other one. That's the
>problem that needs to be fixed, not Band-Aided by giving the Army
>its own air force.
Bill,
In a perfect world, that may be so. We are not in one.
I want to point out a hidden core assumption of the two sides that underlie the UAV development wars.
1) The USAF seems to think these UAVs are going to become high-dollar, small-number items, that only officers can fly.
2) The Army and USMC groundpounders are thinking (relatively) near-throwaway -- no less so than the MRAP or M113 chassis. Any NCO or warrent officer could operate them and that borrowing controllers from the gaming industry will make them cheap.
3) The AF "fear of sub-optimal use" is basically that F-16 or F-15 class assets will be in the wrong place to do any good.
4) The Army/Marine assumption is that while a lot of units may not have the manned air, there will be enough UAVs that the full coverage -- down to at least company and maybe platoon level -- is made as a part of the normal ground combat combined arms team.
The reason this assumption is critical is related to development and budget. If your internal assumption is that these will be at least as expensive as an F-16 or F-15, you become willing to eat cost overruns that are still below that level.
If your assumption is that they need to be as common as an MRAP or M113 chassis, you drop the gold plate that decrease availability at the sharp end.
The war time realities of Iraq and Afghanistan, where every company grade combat arms officer has a UAV, argues that the ground pounders vision of the future is winning.
The reality is that UAVs are taking over the close air support and aerial reconnaissance roles. Budget will soon follow that fact. If the USAF brass does not head these UAV development trends off and fast, their existance as a seperate service is at stake.
That is why the USAF made a play for UAV devlopment control via air traffic control. A system where they can use the air tasking order/air traffic control to limit the total number of air vehicles automatically gets the UAV development curve going back up the Pentagon "gold plating because we can only have a few of them" path the USAF pioneered.
However, the US Navy for one will not allow USAF to do that under any circumstances.
The Navy does not currently have stealth manned fighters or super long ranged air-to-air missiles for its F/A-18E/F. The F-35 may or may not happen.
The Navy absolutely needs long ranged stealthy UAVs to keep their carriers competative with both the foreign military threat and -- more importantly -- the budget threat the USAF represents to its carrier fleet.
The Army and USMC will side with the US Navy regards UAV development for their own interests as well.
Yet, as I evaluate it, I keep coming back to the fact that the USMC can best trump the USAF bureaucratic aerial traffic control ace as they have jet fighters and air traffic control capabilities built into their Expeditionary Forces as a matter of course.
This will be the "Key West Agreement" fight for the 21st century with the outcome determining the future existance of the organizational backbones of the military services.
It does not look good for Team Air Force.
In fact, I would debate whether Predator/Sky Warrior is actually the right UAV for CAS. You could argue that you should go in one of two directions: upwards to the Reaper size (radar, range and speed and a bigger weapon load) or downwards to the Insitu class (organic, long endurance, and designating targets for other shooters). The problem is that the UAV runs out of missiles before it runs out of gas.
And whether you call Predator-class UAV operators pilots, operators or dungeon-masters, they still need the appropriate training to avoid smacking into other traffic and to deploy lethal ordnance from aircraft. Both have to be done to very high standards, because adding UAVs cannot be allowed to increase the risk of midairs, or the risk of blue-on-blue. So if you think that simply deciding that the crews can be non-pilots or non-officers, or Army, Air Force or Boy Scouts, will solve the problem (which is that maintaining a UAV force has a large training burden) I don't agree with you.
The reason that people appear so conservative is that the use of UAVs will be greatly restricted if a UAV ever manages to take down a manned aircraft in a mid-air. And it will be worse by an order of magnitude if the UAV - whether to save money or to facilitate a UAV grab by any particular service - is being flown by someone without airways pilot training.
>a Predator can only cover so much ground if it's operating under a
>5000 foot ceiling, no matter how good its sensors are.
This is why the Army is developing a SAR sensor for its Shadow size or larger UAVs.
>In fact, I would debate whether Predator/Sky Warrior is actually
>the right UAV for CAS. You could argue that you should go in one
>of two directions: upwards to the Reaper size (radar, range and
>speed and a bigger weapon load) or downwards to the Insitu class
>(organic, long endurance, and designating targets for other
>shooters). The problem is that the UAV runs out of missiles before
>it runs out of gas.
Bill,
Let's examine that thought.
The Predator is a reconnaissance aircraft that could carry a pair of Hellfire missiles. They cost about $4.5 million each (with sensors, about half as much without)and can stay in the air 40 hours.
The Reaper was designed as a combat aircraft that also does reconnaissance. Specification wise, the 4.7 ton Reaper has a wingspan of 66 feet and a payload of 1.7 tons. It can carry over half a ton of GPS or laser guided bombs, as well as the 250 pound SDB, or Hellfire missiles. It costs $8.5 million (with sensors), but can only stay in the air 24 hours.
The differences between the two UAVs boil down to endurance, load carrying capability and speed.
According to data I picked up from Wikipedia:
>The MQ-9 has a 950-shaft-horsepower turboprop engine, far more
>powerful than the Predator's 119 hp (89 kW) piston engine. The
>increase in power allows the Reaper to carry 15 times more
>ordnance and cruise at three times the speed of the MQ-1.[1]
The Army Sky Warrior, OTOH, (a) weighs 1.5 tons, (b) carries 300 pounds of sensors internally, (c) carries up to 500 pounds of sensors or weapons externally, (d) costs $8 million. It has a wingspan 56 feet is 28 feet long, an endurance of up to 36 hours and a top speed of 270 kilometers an hour.
Compared to the Reaper, the Sky Warrior is still a "reconnaissance aircraft that could carry weapons." One that trades two more Hellfire hard points for four less hours of endurance compared to the original Predator.
I would argue that is exactly what the Army wants because it sees its UAVs as __forward observers for its precision guided artillery__.
The primary role of the Sky Warrior for the Army is to be the unblinking eye of for the ground soldier that can tell him what is over the next hill or the next alley.
The artillery runs 24/7 and never runs out of ammunition like a CAS plane does. Arming UAVs, to the Army, are simply a step to reduce the time in the kill chain targets between the decisions to shoot ordinance to its arrival for time critical targets. For that "reducing the time in the kill chain" concept to work, you need a lot of armed, long endurance, UAVs over the area of operation in the control of the men on the ground meeting their needs.
Rather being in an industrial age, pre-precision guided weapon, era of airpower that required centralized in order to mass effectively to achieve results. We have entered an information age, precision strike era of "Federalized Airpower" that works best when its control and capability are defused across the whole battle space.
The emerging US Army Armed UAV/PGM Artillery kill chain essentially humbugs USAF doctrine because "When seconds count, the USAF is minutes away."
Look at the following 2004 era US Army artillery PGM master plan with that thought in your head and consider the force structure implications:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004precision_strike/ValcourtPEO_Huntsville.pdf
Then look at this link and think again about that when the Netfires/NLOS-LS show up spreading missiles in a box across the entire US Army battle space:
http://www.defense-update.com/products/n/netfires.htm