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Breaking off a little chunk from my story in DTI's October issue:Given all the unknowns in the budget situation, Army leaders are moving forward with three combat vehicle programs—two wheeled and one tracked. How many will actually make it to the fleet remains to be seen, though the service maintains that all three—the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), the (tracked) Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), and the Humvee recap program—are doable. Others aren’t so sure. Stephen Daggett of the Congressional Research Service recently told DTI that he thinks “the Army is going to give up the Ground Combat Vehicle and JLTV” in subsequent budgets, relying instead on recapped Humvees, Strykers, M-ATVs (MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles) and recapped M-ATVs. In August, the Army awarded almost $900 million to two teams led by BAE Systems and General Dynamics for its GCV program, a move that appeared to be a big vote of confidence in the program. But then came the details. In giving the green light to the program, Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter instructed the Army to conduct two analyses of alternatives (AOA), which will come on top of the AOA the Army completed to ensure that no existing programs perform the tasks envisioned for the GCV. Army Col. Andrew DiMarco, GCV project manager, asserts that his office “looked at a variety of platforms,” including the Bradley and the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle, as well as several foreign programs such as the Puma infantry carrier, made by Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall Land Systems. None had the capabilities that the Army believes it can achieve with a newly built vehicle. The other sticking point in Carter’s memorandum was the issue of differing price estimates between the Army and the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. While the Army is sticking to its average unit manufacturing cost range of $9-10.5 million, and its $11-13 million estimate for average unit production cost—which includes spare parts—CAPE estimates the average unit production cost to be $16-17 million, DiMarco reveals. He calls the discrepancy the result of “different methodologies” in estimating costs.Click through to read the whole thing here...
Given all the unknowns in the budget situation, Army leaders are moving forward with three combat vehicle programs—two wheeled and one tracked. How many will actually make it to the fleet remains to be seen, though the service maintains that all three—the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), the (tracked) Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), and the Humvee recap program—are doable. Others aren’t so sure. Stephen Daggett of the Congressional Research Service recently told DTI that he thinks “the Army is going to give up the Ground Combat Vehicle and JLTV” in subsequent budgets, relying instead on recapped Humvees, Strykers, M-ATVs (MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles) and recapped M-ATVs. In August, the Army awarded almost $900 million to two teams led by BAE Systems and General Dynamics for its GCV program, a move that appeared to be a big vote of confidence in the program. But then came the details. In giving the green light to the program, Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter instructed the Army to conduct two analyses of alternatives (AOA), which will come on top of the AOA the Army completed to ensure that no existing programs perform the tasks envisioned for the GCV. Army Col. Andrew DiMarco, GCV project manager, asserts that his office “looked at a variety of platforms,” including the Bradley and the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle, as well as several foreign programs such as the Puma infantry carrier, made by Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall Land Systems. None had the capabilities that the Army believes it can achieve with a newly built vehicle. The other sticking point in Carter’s memorandum was the issue of differing price estimates between the Army and the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. While the Army is sticking to its average unit manufacturing cost range of $9-10.5 million, and its $11-13 million estimate for average unit production cost—which includes spare parts—CAPE estimates the average unit production cost to be $16-17 million, DiMarco reveals. He calls the discrepancy the result of “different methodologies” in estimating costs.
Given all the unknowns in the budget situation, Army leaders are moving forward with three combat vehicle programs—two wheeled and one tracked. How many will actually make it to the fleet remains to be seen, though the service maintains that all three—the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), the (tracked) Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), and the Humvee recap program—are doable.
Others aren’t so sure. Stephen Daggett of the Congressional Research Service recently told DTI that he thinks “the Army is going to give up the Ground Combat Vehicle and JLTV” in subsequent budgets, relying instead on recapped Humvees, Strykers, M-ATVs (MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles) and recapped M-ATVs.
In August, the Army awarded almost $900 million to two teams led by BAE Systems and General Dynamics for its GCV program, a move that appeared to be a big vote of confidence in the program. But then came the details.
In giving the green light to the program, Pentagon acquisition chief Ashton Carter instructed the Army to conduct two analyses of alternatives (AOA), which will come on top of the AOA the Army completed to ensure that no existing programs perform the tasks envisioned for the GCV. Army Col. Andrew DiMarco, GCV project manager, asserts that his office “looked at a variety of platforms,” including the Bradley and the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle, as well as several foreign programs such as the Puma infantry carrier, made by Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall Land Systems. None had the capabilities that the Army believes it can achieve with a newly built vehicle.
The other sticking point in Carter’s memorandum was the issue of differing price estimates between the Army and the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. While the Army is sticking to its average unit manufacturing cost range of $9-10.5 million, and its $11-13 million estimate for average unit production cost—which includes spare parts—CAPE estimates the average unit production cost to be $16-17 million, DiMarco reveals. He calls the discrepancy the result of “different methodologies” in estimating costs.
Tags: vehicles, army, ar99, wellington