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An EASA emergency AD (2010-0242-E) issued today sheds a bit more light on what may have caused the Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine failure aboard a Qantas A380 Nov. 4. From the directive:Pending conclusion of the investigation, EASA issued AD 2010-0236-E to require repetitive inspections of the Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) stage 1 blades and case drain, HP/IP structure air buffer cavity and oil service tubes in order to detect any abnormal oil leakage, and if any discrepancy is found, to prohibit further engine operation.Since issuance of AD 2010-0236-E, the incident investigation has progressed and inspection data from in-service engines has been gathered and analysed. The results of this analysis show the need to amend the inspection procedure, retaining the inspection of the air buffer cavity and focusing on the oil service tubes within the HP/IP structure (emphasis added).Today's AD supersedes the Nov. 10 EASA directive, but retains much of that AD's requirements, including the initial inspections within 10 cycles and repetitive checks every 20 cycles.Australian investigators reported last week that they are well into the probe of the incident. A preliminary report is expected in early December.
Since issuance of AD 2010-0236-E, the incident investigation has progressed and inspection data from in-service engines has been gathered and analysed. The results of this analysis show the need to amend the inspection procedure, retaining the inspection of the air buffer cavity and focusing on the oil service tubes within the HP/IP structure (emphasis added).
Tags: om99, QF32, EASA, Airbus, A380