Where does the Army see EW relative to other warfare needs?

This is about electromagnetic spectrum control. It is a ground warfare capability, just like maneuver.

That is a shift. When did the Army take such a strong interest in EW?

In Iraq; the enemy was able to defeat aircraft with million-dollar electronic defense systems with a $2 radio or key fob. We could not let that happen again.

What have been some of the biggest challenges in developing Army-centric EW, especially in the initial stages?

Commanders had to decide whether they wanted to protect themselves, or communicate. [Now,] it is in developing a core capability in an economically austere environment.

What about the EW systems and capabilities offered by other services—do you need something that they fail to offer?

The Navy and Air Force are good at what they do. They are wonderful at jamming and the suppression of air defense. Joint aircraft do a great job at what they need to do—radar suppression. But we need something more. What they are doing—and what we need—is different enough. We need an all-weather, 24-hours-a-day ability to control the EW domain.

The Army is not proposing any of the large, relatively expensive EW platforms being developed by the Air Force or the Navy. Do you plan to leverage some of the technology efforts from the other services for your own efforts?

It is a matter of taking what we already have and packaging it and tailoring it for the Army. It is an advantage. We get a lot of bang for our buck.